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Russia in 2007 moved further away from a constitutional order governed by
the rule of law as President Vladimir Putin’s second term drew to a close
and the country prepared for parliamentary and presidential elections. High oil
and gas prices buoyed the economy, but little progress was made in address-
ing Russia’s serious social problems. In foreign policy, confrontation with the
West was balanced by excellent relations with most of Asia.
Keywords: Russia, Asia, succession, energy, state power
 
Domestic Politics: Leadership Succession
 
The question of leadership succession dominated Russian
politics in 2007. Putin’s second term drew to a close, and the central question
was not whether but how the former KGB lieutenant colonel would continue
to exert power after March 2008. Many within Russia urged the popular presi-
dent to ignore the constitutional term limit and rule indefinitely, emulating Ka-
zakhstan’s President Nursultan Nazarbaev. But Putin preferred to maintain a
democratic façade and opted for a subtle strategy of positioning a loyal fol-
lower to assume the presidency, while he would presumably control the levers
of power from elsewhere in the government structure. First Deputy Prime
Ministers Sergei Ivanov and Dmitrii Medvedev seemed to be the president’s
top choices to succeed him, until September, when Putin surprised everyone
by dismissing Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov and appointing in his stead the
obscure director of the Federal Financial Monitoring Service, Viktor Zubkov.
It was not clear that Mr. Zubkov, who had reached retirement age, was Putin’s
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intended successor; Medvedev and Ivanov still seemed very much in conten-
tion. A week after the December 2 Duma elections, Putin announced he would
back his loyal protégé Medvedev for the presidency.
In Russia’s unique brand of party politics, the pro-Kremlin United Russia,
chaired by Duma Speaker Boris Gryzlov, continued to strengthen its dominant
position in the Duma and throughout the regions. For a Just Russia, which had
formed in October 2006 with Kremlin support from three smaller parties, also
supported the president, but the party’s influence weakened through the year
as United Russia became Putin’s clear favorite. Putin, who had remained
above parties to this point, formally threw his support behind United Russia,
announcing at its October congress that he would head the party’s list for the
December elections, indicating that he might accept the post of prime minis-
ter. Putin later explained on the United Russia website that he was motivated
by a desire to preserve order, stability, and the gains of recent years, and to en-
sure that the Duma functioned as a fully capable institution, not as it had in the
early 1990s.
A new electoral law was in effect for the December 2007 elections, a pure
proportional representation system in place of the mixed proportional represen-
tation and single-member district elections that existed in 2003. A 7% thresh-
old provision replaced the earlier 5% cutoff, ensuring that smaller parties
would be excluded. Most of the mass media in Russia is now under the control
or influence of the government, guaranteeing United Russia the bulk of favor-
able news coverage and positioning the party for a landslide victory in the par-
liamentary elections. Putin’s party enhanced its appeal by placing sports and





 United Russia also benefits from the “administrative resources”
available to the pro-presidential party, support exercised through the regional
governors, virtually all of whom are now Putin loyalists.
As expected, the December 2007 elections resulted in an overwhelming
victory for Putin’s United Russia. The party garnered 64% of the vote and se-
cured 70% of the Duma seats, virtually guaranteeing the legislature’s subser-
vience to the Kremlin. The Communist Party finished second with 11.6% of
the vote, while the Liberal Democrats and For a Just Russia barely made it
into the Parliament with 8.1% and 7.7%, respectively. Domestic opposition
forces and Western observers criticized the elections as unfair and falling well
below democratic standards.





whose careers originated in power ministries such as the Federal Security
 
1. A place high on the list reportedly went for $2–4 million. Being on the United Russia list
was good advertising, helped protect executives from harassment by the police or mafias, and if
they were elected, guaranteed them immunity from prosecution.




Service [Federalnaya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti, FSB], the Interior, and Defense
Ministries) began a ruthless jockeying for position. Warfare between major
clans burst into public view in October when Viktor Cherkesov, head of the Fed-





ing that infighting among the security services could jeopardize the gains in
social order realized under Putin. Cherkesov’s clan reportedly included Sergei
Ivanov, along with Prosecutor General Yurii Chaika and Viktor Zolotov, head
of Putin’s personal security service. Their rivals were Igor Sechin (Putin’s dep-
uty chief of staff), FSB Director Nikolai Patrushev, and his deputy Aleksandr
Bortnikov, together with Putin’s aide Viktor Ivanov and the head of the new
Investigative Committee, Aleksandr Bastrykin. While clashes between the ser-
vices were overtly about corruption, the real issue was uncertainty over the





 High-level Russian politics is more a struggle for power and money
than a dispute over policies.
Olga Kryshtanovskaya, head of the Center for Elite Studies at the Russian
Academy of Sciences, Institute of Sociology, estimates that 26% of the top
elites were members of the security services and up to three-fourths are in some




. Putin has kept the various clans in check by
balancing them off against each other, but as his term comes to an end the fac-
tional infighting has intensified. Russian political forces across the spectrum
approve of Putin’s record in restoring order and enhancing Russia’s position
as a great power. However, it is not clear that loyalty to the state will be able to
overcome the self-interest of the different powerful clans. The outcome, as
Cherkesov warned in his article, could be a “descent into the abyss” of disor-




 and strengthen the more liberal
St. Petersburg-technocrat clan.
Putin’s goal of restoring state power domestically has focused on strength-
ening the “power vertical,” shifting Russia farther away from federalism and
closer to a unitary state. One consequence of this has been the massive growth
of bureaucracy. In addition, the president has used his power to appoint or dis-
miss governors, granted by the Duma after the Beslan massacre, to convince
regional executives to follow the Kremlin line. In 2007, Putin dismissed the gov-





 Many of the dismissed governors subsequently received
appointments on the Presidential Staff, an indication of Putin’s predilection
for rotating executives among offices to keep them in check. United Russia also
played a major role in Putin’s control of the provinces: the party dominated
 




 October 29, 2007.
3. These regional leaders were, in order, Leonid Korotkov, Ivan Malakhov, Mikhail Prusak,
Mikhail Mashkovtsev, Konstantin Titov, and Sherig-Ool Oorzhak.
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many regional parliaments, and the assemblies in turn ratify Putin’s appoint-
ments. In 2007, Putin began requiring governors to submit annual reports on
their regions, giving him the ammunition to dismiss executives who were not
performing or who were not loyal to the center’s agenda. The result of all this
has been stronger personal power but continued weak political institutions.
Modernizing and strengthening the Russian military became a priority in
Putin’s last year. Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov, a close ally of Putin, pro-
jected that defense expenditures would reach $31.6 billion in 2007, four times
the 2002 budget. Ivanov outlined an ambitious plan to procure new Topol-M
ballistic missiles, strategic bombers, air defense systems, and tanks. Commander-
in-Chief of the Navy Admiral Vladimir Masorin announced plans to develop
two aircraft carrier battle groups for the North and the Far East, with construc-





, which Russian experts claim is inadequate to protect sea routes
and the country’s continental shelf, home to rich hydrocarbon deposits and
fishing grounds. Masorin was sacked in September 2007, reportedly for accept-
ing the Legion of Merit award from the United States without first clearing it
with the Kremlin. Masorin received the medal for his role in promoting cooper-
ation with the West, which was at odds with Putin’s confrontational strategy.
Defense Minister Ivanov fared better—Putin promoted him to First Deputy
Prime Minister in February, appointing in his place Anatoly Serdyukov, a
former furniture salesman and head of the Federal Tax Service.
Improvements in the Russian military are constrained by the demographic,
health, and education problems that plague Russian society, because military
recruits tend to be less healthy than the general population. Alcoholism, drug
addiction, accidents, violent crime, HIV/AIDS, high rates of smoking, and pol-
lution combined to produce an average Russian life expectancy of 65.3 years
(73 for women, 59 for men), on a par with many developing nations in Africa.
Overall, the Russian population continued to decline at a rate of about 700,000
per year. To combat these trends, First Deputy Prime Minister Medvedev was
tasked with the “national projects,” improving Russia’s health, education, hous-
ing, and agriculture. He promised that in time total expenditures allocated to
these priority areas would reach some 9% of gross domestic product (GDP).
Moscow engaged in a series of confrontations with the West during the year.
Russia hosted the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) military exercises
in August near Chelyabinsk in the southern Urals, shortly after the Bishkek,
Kyrgyzstan, summit. The central message of “Peace Mission 2007” and the sum-





ington, were responsible for security in Central Asia. The exercises were also
notable as the first time that Chinese troops had conducted major maneuvers
 
4. The other member states are Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.




abroad. In his statements to the participants, Putin expressed criticism of Amer-
ican unilateralism and announced the resumption of regular long-range patrols
of nuclear bombers over the North Atlantic and Pacific. Tellingly, this display
of security cooperation between Russia, China, and the Central Asian SCO
members followed close on Putin’s decision to suspend Russia’s participation
in the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty.
The president’s more assertive posture toward the West fed Russian nation-
alism at home. Patriotism and xenophobia increased, with attacks on foreign-
ers becoming more common. The Kremlin-sponsored youth group Nashi
(Ours) held rallies in support of Putin and harassed the British ambassador
over his willingness to meet with opposition groups. British-Russian relations
reached a low point over the radiation poisoning of Putin critic Alexander
Litvinenko, as London pressed to have his suspected murderer, Andrei Luga-
voi, extradited to face trial. Moscow refused, citing London’s failure to return the
oligarch Boris Berezovsky and Chechen resistance leader Akhmed Zakayev.
Lugavoi became something of a nationalist hero, and the Liberal Democratic
Party of extreme nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky placed his name on its list
for the December parliamentary elections.
The Russian Orthodox Church continued to play a prominent role in Rus-
sian political life. Most ethnic Russians view the Orthodox Church as integral
to Russia’s national identity, though few actually attend services regularly.
The church itself has become more active politically, lobbying for religious
education in the schools and condemning Washington’s plans to install missile









, such as Minister
of Railways Vladimir Yakunin, have promoted a larger cultural and political




Another notable development in 2007 was the Russia Orthodox Church’s his-
toric reconciliation with the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia, which
had long criticized the former for collaborating with the Communists. Mend-
ing the rift strengthened ties to the Russian diaspora community, and the move
received Putin’s strong support.
Focusing Russian national identity around Russian Orthodoxy risks alienat-
ing at least 20% of the population that is non-Russian, a large proportion of
which is Muslim. Intolerance of foreigners was reflected in skinhead attacks
on immigrants from the Caucasus and foreigners, anti-American statements,
 
5. The FSB’s patron saint is Aleksandr Nevsky, the Ministry of the Interior has Saint Vladimir,
the Border Guards Saint Ilya Muromets, and the Strategic Rocket Forces chose Saint Barbara as




, April 20, 2007.
6. “Cheka” is from the Russian initials for the Extraordinary Commission (Chrezvychainaya
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and increasingly xenophobic and anti-Semitic rhetoric among politicians. The
director of the Federal Migration Service estimated that in 2007 there were ten
million illegal immigrants in Russia. A law passed early in the year restricted
foreign immigration, imposed controls on foreign traders who dominate Rus-
sia’s markets, and established quotas on Central Asian, Caucasian, and Chi-
nese migrants.
 
Putin’s Popularity: It’s the Economy
 
Putin’s continued high popularity ratings (between 70%–80% approval) can
be attributed in large part to Russia’s strong economic performance. In 2007,
Russia posted its ninth straight year of expansion, with GDP growth estimated
at about 7%. The dynamic economy was fueled largely by high prices for oil
and natural gas, the country’s major export earners, as well as growing domes-
tic consumer demand, a construction boom, and strong business investment.
Per capita income in the year topped $9,900. Unemployment dropped to 5.7%,
poverty rates declined, and the government amassed some $430 billion in for-
eign currency reserves. But higher than expected inflation caused concern, and
the ruble’s appreciation, together with weak investment in the crucial oil and gas
sectors, threatened a drag on future growth.
Big business in Russia remains closely linked to the government, with top
Kremlin officials routinely serving as executives of major corporations. Putin’s
strategy of intimidating the oligarchs was highly successful; those who did not
flee the country or were sitting in jail have been eager to demonstrate their
loyalty to the president. Some oligarchs were forced to sell part of their hold-
ings to the state; others were encouraged to pursue business deals abroad that
were deemed beneficial to Russia. Putin kept several liberal economists in the
government—most notably Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin (promoted to dep-
uty prime minister), new Economics and Trade Minister Elvira Nabiullina
(former Minister German Gref’s deputy), and Regional Development Minister
Dmitrii Kozak. However, Putin’s commitment to market forces was balanced
with moves to reassert state control over the strategic sectors of the economy
and by an October price freeze on basic foods.
The Russian state continued to tighten its control over oil and gas produc-
tion and other sectors of the economy, using political pressure to acquire new
holdings. Repeated threats of tax investigations and environmental penalties
forced Shell and its Japanese partners Mitsui and Mitsubishi to sell half their
shares in the Sakhalin II project to Gazprom, the state-controlled gas monopoly.
In June, British Petroleum was pressured into selling Gazprom a controlling
stake in RUSIA Petroleum, giving the Russian company the license to the huge
East Siberian Kovykta gas field. In each case foreign companies were allowed
to continue participation in these major projects, but government machina-
tions chilled the climate for international investment.




Corruption and crime posed major problems for the Russian economy and
society. The huge influx of oil wealth exacerbated an already serious corrup-
tion problem—Transparency International ranked Russia 143rd in its Corruption





 Putin pledged to fight corruption, but his pre-
ferred solution consisted of remaking the culture so that bribe taking would no
longer be tolerated, hardly an effective approach. Russia’s weak political insti-
tutions, suppression of civil society and the mass media, and the cozy relation-
ship between big business and government all contribute to a climate of graft.
Ordinary crime also continued to flourish—murder, robbery, racist attacks, drug
trafficking, and organized criminal activity challenged Russia’s state, society,
and economy.
 
Restoring Russia in Asia and the World
 
Russia’s economic success, together with Putin’s skilled leadership, made for
a more confident and aggressive Russia in world affairs. Russian leaders con-
tend that their country is European, but in terms of political interests and inter-
national positions they are more likely to agree with authoritarian China than
with democratic Britain. Russia in 2007 found itself at odds with Europe and
the United States on a number of issues—the possible interruption of oil and gas
supplies, Washington’s plans to install missile defense facilities in Poland and
the Czech Republic, the status of Kosovo, the continuing conflict in Iraq, the
poisoning of Aleksandr Litvinenko, possible NATO membership for Georgia
and Ukraine, and Western criticism of Russia’s growing authoritarianism. By
contrast, Russia in 2007 had excellent relations with Asia, with only a few minor
problems.
In the last full year of Vladimir Putin’s presidency, Russian analysts and
politicians exulted in their country’s return to great-power status, based on rev-
enues from high energy prices and an assertive foreign policy. China is the key
to Russia’s claim to a reinvigorated presence in Asia, as a vital strategic part-
ner and long-term competitor. For Russia, China is a useful counterweight to
the United States, NATO, and the European Union, which are perceived as ag-
gressively encroaching on Moscow’s regional sphere of interest and its domes-
tic sovereignty. Beijing and Moscow routinely condemn American unilateralism,
pointing to the disaster in Iraq as evidence that multilateralist approaches and
respect for international law not only accord with norms of national sovereignty
but are also more effective in dealing with contemporary international issues.
In his February speech to the Munich security conference, President Putin vig-
orously condemned Washington’s disdain of international law and the cavalier
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use of military force by NATO and the United States, saying they destabilized
the international situation. He noted that the combined GDP of India and China
surpassed that of the United States, while the GDP of the BRIC countries (Bra-
zil, Russia, India, and China) was greater than the European Union’s. Putin’s
point, shared by his Asian colleagues, was that the global alignment of forces
is shifting power away from Europe and the United States and will force these
countries to take into account the interests of Russia and the major Asian powers.
The future promises a more multipolar, less Eurocentric, world.
Russia-China relations, based now on pragmatic economic ties and shared
strategic concerns, are the best in years. This year was the “Year of China in
Russia”; 2006 was the “Year of Russia in China.” Moscow and Beijing agree
that a multipolar world order should supplant American unilateralism, they sus-
pect that Washington is seeking to suppress their legitimate interests as great
powers, and they oppose Western democracy-promotion strategies as destabiliz-
ing. Russia firmly supports China on Taiwan, Xinjiang, and Tibet, as Moscow
has its own separatist fears in the Caucasus. Beyond warm bilateral ties, Russia
and China cooperated through such multilateral forums as the SCO, Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the U.N., where they frustrated American
and European initiatives to resolve the Iranian nuclear problem by the threat of
a Security Council veto. On the Six Party Talks to resolve the North Korean nu-
clear issue, Moscow and Beijing agree that diplomacy is the only legitimate
approach, rejecting the possibility of a military option.
Evolving security arrangements in the Pacific are pushing Russia and China
closer together. Both countries took advantage of U.S. Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice’s absence at the Association for Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) Regional Forum to criticize Washington’s missile defense plans for
Asia and Europe. While U.S. officials argue that a ballistic missile defense
shield is needed to defend against missile launches by rogue states such as Iran
and North Korea, Russia and China claim that a missile defense shield will neu-
tralize their nuclear capabilities, conferring military superiority on the United
States. Australia has indicated it might be interested in partnering with Japan
and the United States on the Pacific missile defense shield, and in March 2007,
Japan and Australia concluded a landmark military agreement, with Washing-
ton’s support. Japan and Australia also conducted naval exercises with Indian,
American, and Singaporean forces in September in the Bay of Bengal near the
vital Malacca Strait.
The Russo-Chinese relationship was not entirely devoid of tensions. As part
of its muscular energy diplomacy, Moscow seeks to monopolize oil and gas
export routes from Central Asia. Beijing, however, has been negotiating with
Central Asian states for direct access to energy resources. The first stage of the
Atasu-Alanshaku pipeline began delivering oil in 2006, with Kazakhstan and
China making plans for a second line to the Caspian Sea. Chinese President




Hu Jintao had also signed an agreement for construction of a 30 billion cubic
meter natural gas pipeline with Turkmenistan’s President Saparmurat Niyazov
just prior to the latter’s death in December 2006. Niyazov’s successor, Gur-
banguly Berdymukhammedov, reaffirmed his intent to honor the agreement,
but the May 2007 deal to route a comparable amount of Turkmen gas through
Kazakhstan and Russia appeared to be a setback for the energy-hungry Chinese.
Russian relations with Japan were cordial, but there was still no progress on
the territorial issue or conclusion of a peace treaty. Trade has expanded stead-
ily, reaching nearly $14 billion in 2006. Although that figure is less than 1% of
Japan’s total turnover, it constitutes 3% of Russia’s and marks a substantial in-
crease over the $4 billion exchanged in 2002. Japanese-Russian relations could
best be described as businesslike and pragmatic, with representatives of gov-
ernment and business consulting regularly at various levels. Energy is a key
motivator for both sides. As construction of the East Siberian pipeline moves
forward, Japan anticipates opening a new source of supply, reducing its un-
healthy reliance on Middle Eastern oil. Russia is no longer as desperate for
Japanese investment and technology as it was in the late 1980s and through
the 1990s, but Russian companies welcome Japanese participation in Siberian
energy projects, particularly in the investment-poor Russian Far East.
In 2007 Putin sought to energize relations with India, in part to restore the
ties of the Soviet era and in part to compete with the United States. Russia rec-
ognizes India’s growing economic and political weight, and India seems deter-
mined not to let its new relationship with Washington restrict its independent
foreign policy. Putin visited India in late January (his fourth trip as president)
and signed a joint statement on cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear en-
ergy. In February the foreign ministers of Russia, China, and India met in New
Delhi to try to develop a common approach to international problems, a strategy
promoted by former Prime Minister Yevgenii Primakov in the 1990s. Energy
and weapons are the key components of Russian-Indian trade relations: Russia
exported $3 billion worth of goods to India in 2006 and imported $1 billion.
India’s state-owned Oil and Natural Gas Company holds a $1 billion stake in
the Sakhalin I project, the country’s single largest foreign investment, and Delhi
is eager to explore additional energy projects with Russia. Indian airborne
troops participated with Russian forces in biennial military exercises in the
Pskov region in northwestern Russia, and the two sides share expertise about
combating insurgencies (Russia in Chechnya and Afghanistan, India in Kash-
mir and the Indian Northeast).
 
Central Asia and the Caucasus
 
Russian foreign and energy policies in Central Asia and the Caucasus focused
on containing security threats and restoring influence lost during the 1990s. The
situation in Chechnya stabilized somewhat under Ramzan Kadyrov, a brutal
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former boxer whom Putin appointed president of the republic (Kadyrov was





rov, who served as prime minister of Chechnya until he reached the presidency-
eligible age of 30, earned Putin’s support by ruthlessly suppressing the rebels.
While Chechnya is quieter, other parts of the Caucasus, such as Ingushetia and
Dagestan, have seen a spike in violence by radical Islamists.
Moscow approached Central Asia and the Caucasus bilaterally and through
several multilateral organizations, the most important being the SCO and the
Collective Security Treaty Organization (Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyr-
gyzstan, Tajikistan, Armenia, and Belarus). The broader Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS) continued to flounder despite Moscow’s efforts at re-
suscitation. At the October summit in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, member states
concluded agreements on immigration and trade, but members criticized the
group’s failure to implement past decisions and tensions with Moscow were
apparent. Ukraine’s President Viktor Yushchenko opted not to attend, Georgian
President Mikheil Saakashvili refused to sign the final document, and Kazakh-
stan’s Nursultan Nazarbayev proposed formation of a common market for Cen-
tral Asia, excluding Russia.
The SCO, by contrast, demonstrated greater unity. During the August SCO
summit in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan members criticized unilateral efforts to coun-
teract threats (a thinly veiled reference to U.S. actions in Iraq and Central
Asia) and pledged cooperation on creating an “anti-narcotics belt” around
Afghanistan. Narcotics trafficking, terrorism, and religious extremism from Af-
ghanistan pose serious threats to Central Asians, and to their larger neigh-
bors. SCO members fear the sort of “color revolutions” experienced by Georgia,
Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan, and are united in their opposition to Western
democracy-promotion efforts. Iran, Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, and Mongolia
attended the 2007 summit as observers, and Turkmenistan was represented for
the first time, an indication of Berdymukhammedov’s readiness to end his coun-
try’s isolation. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad lobbied intensely for
his country to be admitted as a full participant, but members’ reservations about
provoking the United States stymied his efforts.
 
8. The evidence is circumstantial. Politkovskaya, who followed events in Chechnya closely,
interviewed Kadyrov at his headquarters in Tsentoroy in 2004. She subsequently characterized him
as a deranged and brutal coward, accusing him of widespread torture. Politkovskaya, who had told
colleagues she was being threatened by Kadyrov and his people, was working on a story on torture
in Chechen prisons when she was gunned down in her apartment building. See C. J. Chivers, “Jour-




 October 8, 2006; Claire Bigg, “Rus-
sia: Politkovskaya Investigating Chechen Torture at Time of Death,” Radio Free Europe/Radio
















On the surface, Putin appears to have strengthened Russia’s economy, brought
order out of chaos, and restored the country’s great-power status in world af-
fairs. The reality is Russian politics has become increasingly authoritarian and
centralized. Moscow is more comfortable in Asia than with its democratic West-
ern neighbors. Much of the country’s economic success rests precariously on
volatile energy prices. Perhaps most important, Russia has moved away from
a constitutional order governed by the rule of law, in favor of a strong tsar. In
terms of delivering economic well-being to their people, authoritarian systems
perform no better than democracies. Their great weakness is the inability to pro-
vide for a regularized means of succession. Regardless of the outcome of Rus-
sia’s parliamentary and presidential elections, Putin’s consolidation of power,
and his marginalization of opposition forces, will delay indefinitely Russia’s
transition to a normally functioning democratic system.
